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EUROPE  IN  SEARCH  Of  AN  ENERGY  POll CV 
Vi-tal  ~ecisions have to  be  taken,  or  worse 
avoided,  in  the  next  few  weeks:  vital  because 
they  wil I  throw  into relief the West's ability 
to  manage  its external  dependence  for  energyo 
The  supply of energy  ts  fundamental  to  our 
mode~n  industrial  society- if that  suppty 
falters,  fai Is to  grow,  or  declines,  almost 
inconceivably  rapid changes  in  basic attitudes 
and  in  the  economic  and social  organisation  of 
our  societies will.  be  necess~ry.  No  one  would 
deny  the  importance  of what. is at  .St~Jke.,  yet  we 
are  faced  with  this debiritating .inability to 
ag~ee on  a  common  approach  towa~ds energy-
exporting countries,  and  on  the  policies  to  go 
with  it  • 
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These  qu~stions will  ioom  large at the 
forthcoming  European  Summit.  Some  accomo~ 
dation  between  the  eight  member  States  who 
are  ~ember~ of the  I.E.~.  (along with  the 
U.S.A.,  Japan  and others)  and  Francej  who 
remains  o~tside,  i~ essential  if we  are to 
come  to grips with  the  substantive  issues 
behind the  rethor.i c. 
A European  Energy  Po I icy  can  on I y  have 
meaning  in  a  wider  context,  and to the 
extent that the  member  States  can  progressi-
vely  speak  with  one  voice  on  ene~gy matters • 
Momentous  decisions are  in  the  offing 
elsewhere,  no  less.  What  will  be  the 
outcome  of the  OPEC  meeting  on  the  12th· 
December?  How  with the  membe~.States of 
the  I.E.A.  react to  Dr.  KISSINGER'~ recent 
proposals  for  energy  conservation,  and  for 
i 
the  recycling of petrodollars? 
Indeed  Europe's  family  quarrels are  an 
expensive  luxury  at this moment  in  time, 
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Many  react  with  impatience  within  Europe 
and outside.  Surely the  international 
energy  pol icy  put  forward  by  America 
~esponds to the best  interests of  Europe  and 
Japan  as  muc~ as  to those  of  America:  are 
we  not  alI  rich,  ~estern  industrialised 
nations  who  stand or fall  together?  And  if 
i 
so,  what  value  can  there  be  in  a  Community 
policy  which  ha~ an  identity of  its own: 
It  is to that question  which  intend to 
address  myself this evening. 
To  pose  the  question  I ike  that  is to 
introduce  an  e I ement  of confrontation  ·· 
between  American  initiatives and tne  Commis-
-sion's proposed  policy:  the  one  is  seen  as 
the alternative to the other.  That  can  only 
be  wrong:  there  Is  a  very  marge  area  of 
common  interest to  be  bu i it on  pr·ov i ded 
each  party  respects  t.he  rea'i ity ·~f the 
divergencies  of· interest  which  are  no  less 
present.  The  U.S.A.'s  view  of  international 
energy  pol icy  and the  Commission's  proposals 
are  complementary,  yet  each  should  have 
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its proper  identity  by  virtue. of  its proper 
concerns. 
let  me  c'xpl a in  what  I  mean  by  describing 
how  see ihe area  of  common  interest,  and 
where  I  seei  at  least potentially,  the  pos~ 
sibility of divergencies  of  interest. 
The  rich  industrialised countries of  the 
West  face  both  a  long  term  problem  and  a  short 
term  one.  The  short term  problem  has 
served to  focus  attention  on  the  long  term 
problem. 
In  the  long  term,  we  may  face  ser1ous 
shortages of  energy  ~eso~rces - at  least 
for  certain  fuels.  These  shortages  could 
arise because  of the  phys i ca I  ·1  imitations 
of  resources  avai fable  to mankind,  but:mo~e 
I ikely they  wil I  arise because  of the  need 
-to  plan  a  long  way  ahead.t~ meet  the  growth 
of  energy  demand,  and  the  difficulties of 
so  doing  because  of the  uncertainties 
involved  and the  division  of  responsibi I ity 
amongst  those  concerned.- produci.ng  and 
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exporting countries,  enterprises,  importing 
and ~onsuming countries~  end because  of the 
technical  limits that exist  on  our abi!ity 
to substi'tute one  fuel  fur  another. 
In  the short  term  we  fAce  shortages 
because  of accidents or because  of the 
political  decisions of those  who  control 
a  significant part of world trade  in  energy 
resources.  We  not  only  face  shortages, 
but  at present,  we  cannot  predict  with  any 
certainty under  what  conditions  resources 
will  be  available  from  those  capable  of 
exporting them:  a  new  balance  of  power 
is  in  the  process  of being estabf ished 
between  oil  producing countries  and  oi I 
consuming  countries. 
In  the  eyes  of the  Third Worfd,  .. these 
issues stretch  right across the ·w~~le 
spectrum  of  international  trade  - food, 
raw  materia Is, I manufactured  goods  and 
services,  and  ~hus,  in  their  views,  finding 
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this ba I a nee  of ·interest: ·requires  a  new  code  .  I 
of  conduct  for  a H  aspedts of  i nternat  i ona f 
economic  and  commerci~l  relations. 
These  proble~s have  assumed  an  inesca-
pable  and  immediate  importance  for  us  because 
of the  rather br"Jta I  and  shocking  manner  in 
.  I 
which  the  major  ~il  exporters  in  the  Third 
World  have  unila~erally  imposed the njust 
I  . 
pricen  - seen  frcim  their viewpoint.  But 
no  quick  so I uti oris  are 'in  sight  if there 
is  now  a  general  acceptance that  a  combina-
tion of  power  politics and  markets  pressures 
at  least  such  as  have  been  tried to  date  -
ts  not  sufficient to  shake their resolve. 
Without  wish~ng to  imply  that alI  our 
present  economiciills  can  be  traced back 
to this one  cause,  let  me  pause  here to 
underline the  fact  that  crude  oil  prices 
have  more  than  quadrupled between .~eptember 
1973  and  October  1974,  and  often the 
increases are  applied'~ith a  retroactivity 
! 
which  increases  even  more  their  impact. 
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For  exa~ple,  prices  for  Iran  crude  have 
evolved as  foliows 
$per barrel 
1.11.73 
3.47 
I 
1.i.74 
7..37 
1.4.74 
8.68 
1.7.74 
9.47 
_without  taking account  of retroactivity. 
I 
L_10  •. 74 
9.98 
Thereby  I ies  another truth  of funda-
mental  importance  :  the  changing  role  of the 
oil  companies.  They  no  longer  negotiate 
with  producing countries as  of the  16th  October 
1973,  either  on  price or  on  quantity:  they 
implement  the  dec;sions  taken  by  the  producing 
I 
countries.  Their  c~anging role  is highlighted 
even  more  by  the  ra~id expropriation  - though 
with  compensation- of their assets  in  the 
·producing countries.  Even  conservative  Saudi 
Arabia  is  now  expected to acquire  100%  owner-
ship of Aramco's  assets "very  soon",  probably 
in  exchange  for  certain  gua~ante~~ of  supply. 
The  multinationals,  for  the  most  part,  do  not 
expect  to  own  any  major  energy  resources 
outside  the  Western  world  in  the  near  future  -
their role,  their accepted  role  now,  is to  act 
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as  service  companies  in  the  producing areas, 
and distributors  in  the  consumer  areas~ 
As  a  result,  it  is clear that their self-
interest  is  mor~ closely aligned to the  energy 
exporters than  the  energy  consumers  because  of 
the  rear ities of  commercial  life.  And  in  so 
far  as their objective  is to stay  in  the  energy 
business as  integr.ated  companies  with  the 
advantages that  can  offer,  they  must  rapidly 
diversify  into  other energy  sources,  and  in 
particular,  nuclear  energy. 
Imported oil  wil!  rematn  a  very  import-
ant  source  of energy  in  the  Western  w6rld 
for  a  long time  to  come,  Equally,  new  sources 
of energy  and the  rapid  development  of  indi-
geneous  sources  of  supply; are henceforth 
matters  of vital  concern  to consumer  govern-
ments.  They  have  no  choice  but  t'o .  ~tep  in 
and accept  the  responsibi I ity  implied  b~ the 
changing  role  of the multinational  oi I 
companies. 
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finafly,  the tension  imposed  on  the 
world  ~nergy market  endanger  ou~ future 
prosperity because  : 
- the  insecurity.of future  suppry  conditions, 
particularly disturbing for those  countries 
most  dependent  on  external  sources,  risks 
leading to privileged bilateral  trading 
relationships contrary to the  letter and 
spirit of the  G.A.T.T.  agreements; 
- the  social  and  economic tensions  resulting 
from  balance of payments  difficulties 
equally  encourage  protectionist tendencies 
amongst  governments  feast  able  to  manage 
the  consequences. 
It  is  no  secret that. the  U.S.A.,  Japan, 
france  and  West  Germany  for  example,  are  alI 
.  . 
actively seeking,  or  have  achieved,  bilateral 
agreements  with  oi I  producers,  or that  Italy, 
france  and the  U.K.  just to take three 
examples,  wil I  be  confronted with  painful 
poI it  i ca I  decisions  if they  at"e  to re-estab I ish 
their external  equi I ibrium  in  the  foreseeable 
future  without  recourse to  protect~on  . 
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Obviously,  the  dimensions  of the 
problem  set against the  I imited capacities 
of the  nation States,  seen  1n  isolation, 
requires co-operation  amongst  the  major 
energy  consumers  and  importers,  and  for the 
following  reasons 
(i)  the  need to  co-operate  during periods 
of extreme  tension  on  the  oil  market 
to avoid mutually  ruinous  overbidding 
for  whatever supplies are available; 
( i i )  the  need to accelerate  th~ development 
of energy  resources  outside the 
sovereignty of traditional  exporters 
of oil,  and to accelerate the· develop-
ment  of alternative  sources  of energy; 
(iii)  the  need to  redefine  the  role  of the 
( i v) 
multinationals  and their future  relation-
ship  with  the  pubf ic  i~te~~~t  ; 
the  need to co-operate  •n  resolving 
the  immediate  problems  1n  international 
trade  and  in  international  finance,  and 
to  head  off the threat  of  an  interna-
tiona I  recession; 
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(v)  theneed to co-operate  in  working  out  a 
new  balance of  shared  interest  with the 
major  energy  export~rs,  on  the basis of 
~hich a  new  stability  os  supply  can  be 
assured  a 
The  pr•ogrammes  proposed  in  the  I EA'  and 
by  the  Commission  both  respond to these 
interests.  True  different  aspects are  developed 
to different  degrees,  different priorities are 
evident,  but  the~e  is  no  disagreement  about 
the  broad thrust of what  needs to be  done • 
Thus  the  elements  of  common  interest 
·are evident  and  recognised  :  it  is clear that 
co-operation  amongst  consumers  in  times  of 
crisis must  be  I inked to  a  longer  term  . 
prog~amme to  reduce  dependence  on  0  i !  In 
advanced  industrialised societies and to 
accelerate the  d~velopment' of alternative 
sources,  while  conserving  ~nergy .and  ~~suring 
its more  efficient use.  Thus  the u:s.A. 
proposes  an  immediate  conservation target for 
1975  of a  reduction  of  3  mill ion  barrels a  day, 
and  a  longer  term  action  programme  for  the 
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·.rat  i ooal  use of energy.  ·The  Commission 
proposed much  the  same  wh He  emphasizing the 
J  onger  tern1  approach,  el i mi nat  i ng  t.,raste  rather 
than  restricting demand. 
Secondly,  the~e ore  grave  risk~  in 
tackling all  these problems  in  isolation even 
for  economies  of a  size and  importance  I ike 
that of the United States.  Those  who  are 
embarking  upon  expensive  programmes to 
substitute alternative fuels  and  develop  new 
resources  where  possible  need  mutual  assurance 
that oil  and  gas  wil I  henceforth  be  treated 
as  noble  resourc~s~  for  of course,  there are 
still  vast  reserves  of oil  and  gas  which  are 
technicai.Jy  available to  us  from  the  Middle 
East  and  e I sewhere at  a  very  I ow  cost..  A 
certain collective assurance  against the 
consequences  of  an  eventual  return to  cheap 
oil  is  required~  even  if such  an  event  seems 
unlikely at  p~~~ent. 
The  U.S.A.  proposed  th~t the  lEA 
address this problem:  the  Commission's 
pol i6ies  propose  guarante~for the  fuel  most 
at risk  in  Europe  - coal. 
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Thirdiy,  an  effort  on  the  appropriate 
scale  amongst  all  the  major  ?onsequences  re-
quires  a  certain consistency 'between  national  . 
objectives to create the  climate  of co-operation 
necessary  for  the  relatively free  movement  of 
knowledge,  capital,'  equipment  and skilled 
management  and  manpower  between  countries,  and 
the  removar  of barriers to trade  - especi~l ly 
in  energy  resources  - which  is the  concommitent 
of that.  No  disagreement  there. 
Fourthly,  as  I  mentioned  before,  the 
future  role of the  oil  companies  is  not  an 
issue the  individual  State  can  tackle  very 
easily.  Such  initiatives are  most  I ikely 
.  . 
to  be  successful  ~s part  of  an  international 
framework  laying  down  guide! ines  and  mutual 
obi igations  of  information,  consultation  and 
co-operation  both  between  Governments  and 
between  Governments  and  the  oi I  _co~np~_n1es. 
Then  agatn,  it  is self-evident that 
co-operation  between  consumers  in  times  of 
severe tension  in  the  market  can  only  be 
really effective  if alI  the  major  oi I 
importers  co-operate  in  mutual  obi igations 
for  conservation,  stocks  or  stand~by produc-
tion,  and  in  the  management  of  an  agreed 
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equitable~llocatio~ of  avaifabl~  supplie~: 
other~ise the temptation to break  ranks  for  the 
temporary  benefits of being  o~e of the 
reneg.des  may  b~com~  irresi~ta~le. 
The  lEN  ~rovides a  system of crisis 
management  which i• essential  to building up 
the  mutual  confide~ce necessary for  long-term 
co-operation. 
last and not  least,  let us  remember 
that  Europe  and  Japan  must  inevitably  remain 
heav i I y  dependent  u·pon  externa I  sources of 
energy  resources.  Therefore,  Western  Europe 
and  Japan  have  a  special  interest  in  co-
operation  with  the  U.S.A.  if only  because 
the  presence  of the  U.S.A.  in  international. 
energy  is after all  so  decisive.  In  the  longer 
term,  American  domestic  ~xploration efforts 
for  new  reserves,  the accelerated development 
of  conventional  resourc~s, thi  iht~~duction 
of  new  resources,  and  measures  to reduce 
consumption,  could  have  a  truly significant 
impact  on  the  world  market,  a  market  to  which 
the  Community  and  Japan  ~ust  inevitably be 
substantial fy  committed for  the  foreseeable 
future,  even  if to  a  reduced degree. 
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The  sum  of the  contributions  which 
the  Community's  member  States can  make  towards 
resolving these  problems  (with  the  exception  . 
of the  last)  can be  much  greater if pof icies 
are  pursued consistently and  coherently at  a 
Community  fevef.than  would  be  the  case  if 
European  policies  were  the  simple  sum  of 
nationally-derived and  nationally-based 
pof icies.  lf we  act  as  a  unit,  we  can 
contemplate  a  much  greater  degree  of ambition, 
and  firm  commitments at  a  regional  level  wi  I I 
calf  for  a  corresponding  response  on  a  world 
scale.  They  wifl  ensure  the credibility 
of  Europe  both  in  concert  with  the  consumers, 
9nd  in  any  forthcoming  dialogue  with  the 
producers. 
This  is the  first  reason  for  a  European 
energy  pol icy,  a  reason  completely  in  harmony 
with  the  objectives  and  programme  9f·the 
I.E.A. 
But  now  let  me  look  at  some  of the 
potential  conflicts  of  interest  as  the  second 
reason  for  a  European  energy  pol icy.  The 
Community's  member  States  sometimes  have  a 
common  interest  which  is  not  ~xactfy  synony~ous 
. I. 
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with all  the other majorconsumers,  and  where 
it is  important to preserve  a  balance of 
iriterest  acceptable to all. 
The  U.S.A.  could profit from  the  energy 
crisis and  it~ finahcial  consequences to 
consolidate  its  leadership over the Western 
World. 
Now  that the  OPEC  cartel  has  demonstrated 
a  certain  cohesion,  high  prices  seem  here to 
stay for at  least  a  while to  come.  Thomas 
Enders;  Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic  and  Business Affairs,  and  generally 
believed to be  chief architect of  Mr.  KISSINGER~ 
energy  pol icy, set out  in  a  recent  speech  at 
Yale  University  how  the  United States  interests 
as  a  major  producing country,  and  as  a  super-
power  anxious to avoid.the  debilitating 
effects of  g.row i ng  externa I  dependance,  might 
now  begin to  coincide  with  the  interests of 
producers  elsewhere. 
let  me  explain  what  I  mean  by  this: 
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ProJet  lndependance Studies  suggest 
that at the  $7  priceper barrel  for oil, 
US  de~eridancy on  imported oil  would  continue 
to  grow~ widening to  13  million  b~rrels a  day, 
almost  half of  af I  the  US'petroleum  needs. 
On  the other  hand,  at  a  price of $11  a  barrel, 
the  need for  i mpor'ted  o i I  -:ou I d  have  been 
substantially eliminated by  1985. 
In  so  far  as the  UcS.  is  leaning  more 
and  more  towards  independance,  their  interests 
and those  of the  OPEC  oil  prodvcers  begin to 
coincide,  to the  exclusion  of the  consumer 
interest.  For  Europe  and  Japan,  in  price 
terms,  there  wi  I I  be  little or  nothing to 
choose  between  paying the bill  for  development 
ih  OPEC  countries,  and  paying the  bil I  for 
us  energy  independance,· and  a  restoration 
of the  United States traditional  political 
and  economic  freedom  of manoeuvre. 
Thus  when  the  U.S.  proposes  an  oil 
price  floor  to  member  States of  the  lEA  to 
protect  high  cost  domestic  production,  the 
question  immediately  arises just  how  far 
should  Europe  and  Japan  go  tn  supporting  U.S. 
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production ef·forts - ·given the costs as  wei I 
as  th~ benefits this entails- Europe  needs 
to  def~ne  ~ position on  thi~ difficult 
que$ti ore. 
Secondly,  the  producing countries may 
well  be  willing to consider  some  reduction  in 
present price  levels  in  return  for  reforms 
in  international  trading relationships. 
Here  it  is a  fact that the  European 
Community  has  been  more  ready to envisage 
reforms  in  the  existing  international  trading 
order than  has the  U.So  the  system of general-
ised preferences  has  been  taken  much  further 
by  the  Community,  and the  idea  of  a  guaranteed 
minimum  income  to  regular. suppliers of  raw 
materials  was  admitted  in  the  recent  round 
i 
of negotiations  with  the associated and 
associable  countries at  Jamaica.  Europe 
is  more  wi  II ing  to  discuss pnl itically 
determined "just" prices for  raw  material• 
and  is  less anxious  to  impose  the  discipline 
of the  free  market  on  her  suppliers.  This 
ambivalence  is reflected  in  the  uncomfortable 
position the eight  states who  are  members 
./ . 
... 
·' 
"  . 
.  : 
, 
l 
. i 
•  I 
'  ...  J .  ·, 
' ... ; 
I. 
.  'I 
' . 
- :. •• 4'dl,... ·--·~·  ~·. 
"  ,_·;  ..  ;. 
• •  ;;.  _• o"\  '  ··'!·•• ..... •U:  '  ._....  0. ~~· •  (  ...":'·  .,__o ..  - oo>  ....  ~  -..  ..:·. 
·'=  ......  i 
...  19  -
both  of the  lEA  and or  the  European  Co"'mu-
nity find themselves  in.  They  accept  the 
need  for  an  early  dialogue  with  the  producing 
countries  ~nd with  the Third World  :  there-
fore,  they  welcome  the Tripartite conference 
proposed by  President  Giscard d'Estaing 
in principle.· All  the  same,  they  feel  that 
the  consumers  and  importers  need  more  time 
to  prepare this conference. 
Thus  there  is  an  interest  in  conciliating 
the  French  position  which  calls for  an  early 
conference  and  piays  down  the  need for  a  large 
degree  of co-ordination  between _consu~ers 
beforehand,  and  the  American  position  which 
emphasises  the  need  for  a  united  consumer 
program  as  the  negotiating counter  in  any 
eventual  dialogue:  a  dialogue  which  could 
not  be  fruitful  unti I  the  proper  balance  of 
power  has  been  estabf ished.  Europe .needs to 
find  a  pol icy  which  conciliate~ th~~e positions, 
for,  In  reality,  there are  elements  of ·truth 
in  both  approaches,  and  neither  expressed  in 
its extreme  form  conforms  to  our  best  interests. 
Final fy,  there are  nervous  reactions  to 
the  way  Dr.  KISSINGER  and  the  U.S.  administra-
t i on  I i n k  t h  c  r e c y c I i n n  ·of  pet  r o do I I a t• s,  ,, n 
. I. 
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which  the  U.S.  intends to pfay  a  major  role, 
and the  good behaviour of recipient  countries 
as  defined  from  the  U~S.;  point of  view.  The 
U.S  ..  approach  to energy  pI anni ng  not  unatura 1-
ly reflects their domestic  viewpoint.  For 
example: 
-the proposal  for  a  3-mill ion  barrels per 
day  reduction  in  oil  demand  by  lEA  member 
states  in  1975  reflects the  American 
structure of  consumption,  and the current 
recession  which  pulls  do~n demand  by 
itself.  Applying  such  reductions  tn  the 
European  and  Japanese  contRxt  could  have 
much  more  ser~ous economic  and  social 
effects. 
-the emphasis  on  the  right price  level  for 
energy basically  reflect~ the  free  enter-
prise  approac~- creating the  right·· 
conditions for  the private sec'tor to  get 
on  with  the  job.  Many  European  countries 
prefer to subsidise high  dost  energy 
sources  and to  control  much  more  closely 
the profits and activities of private 
enterprise. 
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A facility for $25  bill ion  in  1975 
is a  very  important  persuader of countries 
- deep I y  in debt:  Europe  needs to ensure that 
the associated  pr~ssures to  conform  in  terms 
of basic  ~conomic policies and the actions 
being. taken  to  reduce  dependance  on  o i I 
.. 
.. 
'• 
(as  set out ·in  Secretary SIMON's  speech  on 
November  19) are  compatible  with  her  interests. 
Here  again,  the  Community  needs  t&  express 
an  identity of  interest  in  the  lEA,  which 
the  existence  of  a  European  energy  pol icy 
will  permit. 
Finally,  at the  risk of  introducing 
ideas  known  to  be  unpopular  1n  many  circles 
hare  in  Britain,  there  is  ~ purely  nEuropean" 
re~son for  having  a  European  energy  pol icy. 
The  pressures  imposed  by  the  energy  c~isis 
and  its aftermath  are tending to  undermine 
mutual  confidence  between  member  states and 
confidence  in  the  relevanc~ of the  Community 
as  a  reliable  vehicle  for  problem-solvirig. 
What  is at  stake  is  whether the  Community 
can  ever  be  anything  more  than  a  "fair-
weather"  Communit~  •. Without  the  confidence 
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coming  from  progress  in the energy f.ield, 
pr()gress  in  foreign  policy and  in the 
economic,  monetary,  social  and  regional 
field~ involving  ~eal  compromises of natioriat 
interest  is hard t6 envisage. 
The  risk  is not  solefy of  a  check 
in the  for~ard pr~gress of the  Community, 
but  of a  gradula  erosi~n of all  that  has 
been achieved to date,  particularly  in  trade 
and agricultural  policy,  and  a  growing 
bitterness between  the  "Atlantic"  group  and 
france.  The  consequences  would  clearly 
be  very profound:  the  strains·which  might 
bring them  about  are  already  amply  evident. 
Thus  a  certain  amount  of progress to-
wards~ European  energy  po~icy  is essential 
in the next  months.  The  E~ropean Summit 
must  conciliate the  differencesbetween  France 
and  her partners  over the  lEA.  The  Energy 
Counci I  on  December  17th  must  adop  precise 
quantitative objectives to_diversify the 
supply of energy  and  r~duce demand,  as  the 
foundation  for  a  com~on programme  between 
now  and  1985. 
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The  ~ssenti~l  elements  of this program, 
in  the  Commission's  opinion,  should  be  as 
fo I lows  : 
- reduce  growth  in  energy  consumption  for  5  % 
p~a. to  3o5%  p.a.  by  the  rational  use  of 
energy. 
-reduce external  dependance  for  oil  from 
63%  to  45%. 
accelerate the  introduction  of nuclear  such 
that about  half our electricity  need~ are 
met  from  nuciear  sources  by  1985. 
stabilise Community  production  of coal,  and 
open  up  the  Community  market  progressively 
to  coa I  imports. 
The  Commission  has  propos~d guide! ines 
for  a  Community  action  programme  in  each 
of the  major  decision  areas -the rational 
use  of energy,  coal,  oi I  and  gas,  electricity, 
nuclear  fuels  - and  a  series of  proposeq 
instruments  of pol icy  whether  positive  in 
character  - financial  aid and  guarantees  -
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or-negative- dir~ctives-and regulations. 
As  mucih  p~o~re•s ~s posaible  needs ta be 
made  in  adopting these during t.he  next  few 
months,  at the  very  least,we.expec:t. progress 
in the.fiald of the rational  use  of energy  in 
December. 
Equarly  an  immediate  necessitr  ~~~ 
community  measures  for crisis  ~anagement, 
to prevent  any  conflict  in the event  of a 
crisis between  the obligations of the  eight 
member  states who  are  members  of the  lEA 
and their obi igatio~s under the  Treaty of 
Rome a 
Britain~  as  a  potential  major  European 
producer  and  even  exporter of energy,  has  a 
specially creative  role  t~ play  in  formulating 
this European  Energy  Policy.  And  what  is 
demanded  from  her  is by  no  mean~ a·  ~~re act 
of charity.  There  is much  in  the  propo~·ed 
Community  energy  pol icy  of direct  interest 
to ner,  quite apart  from  the  indirect  bene-
fits which  may  be  derived·from  consequent 
progress  in  other areas  of  pol icy.  For 
example  : 
the  British coal  industry  wi  I I  benefit  from 
the political  and  financial  guarantees 
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it c6uld obtain  by  being associated •ith  a 
a  long-term  community  energy policy. 
a·further acceleration of the British 
·nuclear effort would  reduce the  overall 
cost of ener.gy  to the British  consumer 
~nd further  relax pressure  on  the  balance 
~f payments.  This could be  achieved 
without  a  substantially  increased resource 
cost  in  difficult times  by access to 
Community  finance. 
Community  financ~ could rei ieve  the  resource  e 
cost of the  deve I opment  of  North  Sea  0 i I 
and  reduce  dependance  on  private  sources  of 
finance,  thus  giving the  Government  more 
room  for  manoeuvre  in  its relationships 
with  the  multinational .oi I  companies. 
The  rapid development  of the ·North  Sea 
resources  in  the  early eighties  i~  in  the 
inter~st both  of the  U.K.  and  of the  Community: 
no  conflict of  interest arises  for  the  Commu-
nity  wil I  pay  the  world  price  for  what  it 
buys,  and there  need  be  no  doubt  that the 
U.K.  afways  retains  ful I  sovereign  r-i'gh·ts 
to  determine  the  rate  of exploration  and  of 
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production,  should . it.,  at  some  I  ate~ date, 
decid~to introduce stricter conservation_ 
The  concept  of partnership with  producers 
to establ ish  a more  equ itab  I e  di str  i buti on 
.of wealth  between  the  owners  and users  of. 
resources  .- has  been  one  of the  key  elements 
o¥the Community's appr6ach  to  international 
energy policy  fro~ th~ earliest days.  This 
appfies  J~st as much to producers  inside 
·i:he  Community  as to those without.  The  desire 
<,f  the  Un i t~d  ·Kingdom,  and  of Scot I and  in 
paa'ticular,  to  bui ll!d  a  new  il)dustrial  base  as 
the  foundation  for  its future  prosperity wi  II 
be  understood and will  be  supported  by,  the 
Community,  just as  we  understand and  support 
the aspirations of the  OPEC  countries outside 
the  Community.  The  exist~nce of the  common 
market  means  that the  ~ifticult  obst~cles to 
the  diffusion.of technology  and to t·he  sharing. 
of  industrial  capacity and  markets  which  wi  II 
have to be  overcome  in the.latter case,  do 
not  exist for  the  United  K~ngdom. 
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